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I. INTRODUCTION
In KA.C. v. Benson,' the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed
whether a physician was negligent in failing to disclose his HIV
2
seropositive status to patients.' The court reinstated the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the physician, Dr. Philip Benson,
holding that the patient's claim could not go forward because the
undisclosed risk of HIV exposure did not materialize in harm.4
The doctrine of informed consent centers upon the principle of self-
determination, not paternalism.' This Case Note discusses how the
K.A.C. court misapplied the law of informed consent and failed to
1. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
2. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). HIV is a retrovirus which
attacks the human immune system. A person becomes HIV infected when the virus
enters the blood stream and replicates itself. The HIV virus weakens the human
immune system. An HIV-infected individual may not develop any symptoms of infection
for years, or even decades. When these symptoms do begin to appear, the individual
suffers from AIDS-related complex, or ARC. The condition turns into AIDS when the
immune system becomes even weaker and infections normally fought off by the
immune system appear. AIDS is fatal and presently no cure exists. Jay A. Levy, Human
Immunodeficiency Vruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261 JAMA 2997 (1989).
3. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 561-62.
4. Id.
5. In Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914),
Justice Cardoza wrote the oft-quoted phrase, "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.. . ." See
also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960), modified, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960) ("[E]ach man is considered to be master of his own body and he may, if he be
of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance.. . of medical treatment.").
1
Leier: Torts: Defining the Duty Imposed on Physicians by the Doctrine of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
W/LLIAM M/TCIVEL LAW REVIEW
consider the patient's rights.6 The KA.C. decision undermines the
purpose of the informed consent doctrine, which is to promote
patients' decisional authority over their medical treatment.
7
II. HISTORY
A. Historical Development of Informed Consent
Consent to medical treatment, and the contemporary informed
consent doctrine that evolved from it, protects the patient's right of
freedom from unwanted bodily invasions, whether beneficial or not.'
The requirement of consent to medical treatment traces back to
English common law in 1767. Since its origination, the need for
consent has been based on a person's right to determine what shall be
done with his or her body.'0
In Mohr v. Williams, the landmark case in the United States, a
physician failed to obtain a patient's consent to treatment." The
patient consented to having an operation on her right ear.'2 Howev-
er, after surgery began, the physician realized that the patient's left ear
posed a greater health threat and operated on that ear instead. Even
though the physician was not negligent and the operation was a
success, the court held the physician liable for battery. Other jurisdic-
tions soon followed this approach, relying on the theory of battery"
6. The scope of this Case Note does not cover whether actual exposure to the HIV
virus is necessary before a compensable injury exists. For this analysis, see James C.
Maroulis, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damage for Their Fear of
Aids?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 225 (1993).
7. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1973);Jay Katz, Informed Consent- A Faity Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv.
137 (1977).
8. Alan Meisel, The Expansion ofLiabilityfor MedicalAccidents: From Negligence to Strict
Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1977).
9. See Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767) (holding surgeon liable for
damages for not obtaining the consent of his patient before operating). The court
stated, "indeed it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done
to him, that he may take courage and put himself in such a situation as to enable him
to undergo the operation." Id. at 862. Contra Gerald Robertson, Informed Consent to
Medical Treatment, 97 LAw Q. REv. 102 (1981). "The view expressed by some American
commentators that the doctrine of informed consent can be traced back to the English
decision in Slater v. Baker is at best illusory." Id. at 103 n.6.
10. See Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (I1. App. Ct. 1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 268-69, 104 N.W. 12, 14-15 (1905); Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913).
11. Mohr, 95 Minn. at 261, 104 N.W. at 12.
12. Id. at 265, 104 N.W. at 13.
13. The battery doctrine treats the consent, if flawed, as completely invalid. A
patient's consent was thus vitiated when the physician failed to disclose a known risk.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18, at 112-24
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and focusing on patients' rights. 4
Although prior cases dealt with the concept of consent to medical
treatment, 5 the informed consent doctrine itself was first formulated
in 1957.1 It placed a duty on physicians to disclose information to
their patients concerning the inherent risks of proposed treatment,
requiring "full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent."'
7
Later cases helped to define the doctrine and established disclosure
parameters. 18 For instance, exceptions to the disclosure requirement
developed, 9 allowing information material"0 to a patient's decision to
(5th ed. 1984).
14. See Theodore v. Ellis, 75 So. 655, 660 (La. 1917) (holding doctor liable for
failing to inform patient of the full extent of the operation and possible alternatives);
Wojciechowski v. Coryell, 217 S.W. 638, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920) (admitting testimony
to show that physician did not inform patient or his family of the seriousness of his
condition); Hunter v. Burroughs, 96 S.E. 360, 366-68 (Va. 1918) (ruling that doctor has
a duty "in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the danger of possible bad
consequences of using a remedy").
15. "The evolution of the obligation to communicate for the patient's benefit as
well as the physician's protection has hardly involved an extraordinary restructuring of
the law." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
16. Salgo v. Leland StanfordJr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957). The court advanced the following principle: "[a] physician violates his duty to
his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary
to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment."
Id. at 180.
17. Id.
18. See Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960) (reaffirming the duty of the
physician to make a reasonable disclosure of risks, but using a negligence analysis);
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960), aft'd, 360 S.W.2d 673 (1962)
(holding doctor owed patient duty to inform the patient generally of the possible
serious collateral hazards of the proposed treatment).
19. Disclosure is unnecessary in an emergency, when the patient is an incompetent,
or when disclosure would be harmful to the patient's psychological well-being. See
Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. 1982); Keogan
v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1253-54 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); Canterbury, 464
F.2d at 789; Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 439-53
(1979).
20. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: "The Right to Know"
the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12, 40 (1989). Material
information is defined as "information which [a] physician knows or should know would
be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position when
deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure." Arato v. Avedon, 858
P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993). The scope of the required disclosure includes the risks
associated with the proposed treatment, any alternatives to that treatment, and the risks
associated with foregoing any treatment. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 702
(Minn. 1977). Compare Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), affd, 412
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) (requiring disclosure of one percent chance of hearing loss)
with Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982 (Kan. 1964), reh'g, 401 P.2d 659 (1965) (holding no
duty to disclose 1.5% chance of eye loss).
19961
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be withheld only for the patient's therapeutic benefit. In addition,
negligence replaced battery as the basis for liability.2'
Jurisdictions are split concerning the legal standard of physicians'
duty of disclosure to patients in the informed consent doctrine.2 2 A
slight majority follows the traditional
professional practice standard, which requires disclosure of information
that the medical community customarily discloses to patients.23  A
growing number of states, however, apply a patient-based standard
4
that focuses on what a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to know.
25
Because the informed consent doctrine determines liability under
the theory of negligence, 26 the plaintiff must establish a causal
connection between the patient's injury and the physician's breach of
the duty to disclose.2 7 Patients need not only prove that they were
harmed as a result of the medical treatment, but also that had they
been informed of all the relevant information they would not have
consented to the procedure.8 Most courts apply an objective standard
to determine causation, i.e., what a reasonable person in the patient's
position would have done.29 Nevertheless, some jurisdictions adhere
21. Traditional battery law has a very limited disclosure obligation. Katz, supra note
6, at 144. An action for battery is appropriate when the treatment consists of a
touching that is of a substantially different nature and character from that to which the
patient consented. An action for negligent nondisclosure will lie when the patient
understands the nature and character of the touching, but is not properly informed of
a risk involved. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Minn. 1986).
22. Judith F. Darr, Informed Consent: Defining Limits Through Therapeutic Parameters,
16 WHITrIER L. REv. 187, 188 n.5 (1995).
23. E.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ariz. 1975); Stauffer v. Karabin,
492 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1971).
24. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Berkey v.
Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (adopting patient based standard). "To
hold otherwise would permit the medical profession to determine its own responsibili-
ties to the patients in a matter of considerable public interest." Id. at 78.
25. E.g., Cobb v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
26. To establish negligence for failing to obtain informed consent, the plaintiff
must prove: (1) the existence of a material risk unknown to the patient; (2) a failure
to disclose that risk on the part of the physician; (3) disclosure of the risk would have
led a reasonable patient to reject the proposed treatment; and (4) injury resulting from
the undisclosed risk. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980)
[hereinafter Cornfeldt II]; Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. 1981).
27. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790. "A causal connection exists when, but only
when, disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in a
decision against it." Id. (footnotes ommitted).
28. Sharon Nan Perley, From Control Over One's Body to Control Over One's Body Parts:
Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Macey v.James, 427 A.2d 803, 804 (Vt. 1981); Woolley v. Henderson,
418 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Me. 1980); Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791. The objective standard
requires a patient to show that a reasonable person in the patient's position would have
[Vol. 22
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to a subjective standard, which focuses on the particular patient."0
Recent court decisions involving disclosures from and about
physicians may signal a new era in informed consent-extending the
doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries."' These decisions concern
the scope of informed consent and whether disclosure of physician-as-
sociated risks fall within it."2 To date, several reported cases deal with
a health-care provider's duty to disclose HIV seropositive status."
Additional cases focus on a physician's duty to disclose other personal
characteristics, such as success rates and alcohol use. 4
Different jurisdictions considering very similar claims have reached
different conclusions.3" Some courts hold that the informed consent
doctrine encompasses disclosure of information regarding the treating
physician. 6 Others refuse to allow claims for negligent nondisclosure
of provider-associated risks, limiting the informed consent doctrine
withheld consent if the material risks would have been disclosed. Id.
30. E.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965), modified, 411
P.2d 45 (1965); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
295 A.2d 676, 690 (R-I. 1972). But seeJon R. Waltz and Thomas W. Scheunernan,
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L REv. 628, 647 (1970).
31. See Daar, supra note 22, at 188.
32. E.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (explaining the duty of an
HIV-positive physician to disclose his status to his patients).
33. See Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding
HIV-positive surgeon posed a "direct threat" to the health of his patients); Faya, 620
A.2d at 333 (stating that it could not find "as a matter of law," that physician owed no
duty to patients to warn them of his HIV-positive status); Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at
Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding that under the
circumstances, physician had a duty to inform his patients of risk of HIV transmission);
Brzoska v. Olsen, 1994 WL 233866, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 2, 1994) (holding
patients could not recover for "fear of AIDS" unless able to show actual exposure to
HIV).
34. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding duty to
disclose novel or investigational nature of a procedure); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d
1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (concerning physician's duty to disclose alcoholism);
Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding duty
to provide reasonable explanation of available alternatives and potential dangers of
medical procedure). But see Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding no duty to disclose physician's alcoholism).
35. Compare Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217 (holding physician not required to disclose
matters "not specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment," including
physician's alcoholism) with Hidding, 578 So.2d at 1198 (holding physician had duty to
disclose alcoholism to surgical patient).
36. E.g., Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281. In Behringer, the court determined that the
surgeon's HIV status constituted a material risk under the informed consent standard.
Id. at 1279-80. The court then rejected the plaintiff's contention that the informed
consent doctrine did not require the surgeon to reveal his physical condition as a risk
of the surgery itself. Provider-associated risks were deemed disclosable based on a prior
NewJersey case in which "the court spoke of not only an evaluation of the nature of the
treatment, but of 'any attendant substantial risks'". Id. at 1281.
1996]
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only to information regarding the proposed procedure."7
B. Informed Consent in Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to rule that a physician
performing an operation without his patient's consent was liable in tort
for battery.3 8 To reach its decision, the supreme court emphasized the
right of the patient to "be the final arbiter as to whether he will take
his chances with the operation, or take his chances of living without
it." 9 Later cases, still following the theory of battery, expanded the
duty to include informing patients of possible alternatives and allowing
patients to choose the course of action."'
The Minnesota Supreme Court originally recognized a cause of
action for negligent nondisclosure in 1977.41 For the first time in
Minnesota, the court used the theory of negligence rather than
battery.42 The court set forth guidelines but declined to establish a
definite standard for disclosure,43 opting instead to outline a combina-
tion of both the professional and the patient-based standards of
disclosure." Once again the court noted the premise behind the
37. The reason for these conflicting judgments can be attributed to variations in
the informed consent law of these jurisdictions and the different standards applied by
them. The informed consent doctrine would support the imposition of a disclosure
obligation most readily in jurisdictions which employ the patient-based standard to
determine which risks must be disclosed. Mary Ann Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy:
Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55 U. PITr. L REV. 291, 362-63 (1994).
38. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
39. Id. at 14-15 (quoting 1 KINKEAD ON TORTS § 375 (1901)). The court also
quoted Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905):
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first and greatest
right, which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his
person; in other words, the right to himself-is the subject of universal
acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skillful or eminent.., to violate, without permission, the bodily
integrity of his patient... and operat[e] upon him without his consent
or knowledge.
Id. at 14.
40. See, e.g., Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986) (stating "failure
to disclose a very material aspect of the nature and character of the touching will
undermine the consent, and the touching will constitute a battery"); Bang v. Charles
T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) (granting new trial to determine
if doctor would be liable in battery for failure to secure consent of a patient to cut
spermatic cords during prostate operation).
41. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977).
42. Id. at 699.
43. Id. at 701. The court felt the different standards of disclosure had not been
carefully briefed and thus "hesitate[d] to delineate a definitive standard, but instead
advance [dl propositions whose refinement must await a later case." Id.
44. Id. at 702. "Our aim is to make a rational decision by the patient possible
without imposing unreasonable requirements on the physician." Id. The court
[Vol. 22
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doctrine of informed consent: the patient's right to knowingly and
intelligently exercise control over his or her own body.45
Subsequent decisions broadened and refined the rules for disclo-
sure.46 The duty to disclose expanded to include additional risks if "a
reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have known
to be the patient's position would likely attach significance to that risk
.... , In other words, physicians now also need to disclose certain
risks if they are or should be aware that the patient attaches particular
significance to them.4" This is true even if the risks are "not generally
considered by the medical profession serious enough to require a
discussion with the patient .... ""
III. THE KA.C. DECISION
A. The Facts
Dr. Philip Benson, tested positive for HIV on September 12, 1990.
After testing positive, Dr. Benson performed two gynecological
examinations on plaintiff T.M.W.5° He did not disclose his HIV status
to T.M.W. during either visit. Although he wore gloves during the
invasive procedures,5' Dr. Benson had running sores on his hands and
arms.52 T.M.W. inquired about these skin lesions but received evasive
or disingenuous answers.53
In a letter datedJune 17, 1991, Dr. Benson, in cooperation with the
Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners, informed T.M.W. and 335
advanced two rules to define the scope of risks subject to disclosure. Physicians had a
duty to disclose: (1) risk of death or serious bodily harm; and (2) risks that would be
disclosed by a practitioner of good standing in like circumstances. Id. (citing Cobb v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972)).
45. Id. at 701. "Our society is morally and legally committed to the principle of
self-determination, a corollary of which is the right of every adult of sound mind to
determine what shall be done with his own body." Id.
46. E.g., Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 589; Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.
1980).
47. Cornfeldt II, 295 N.W.2d at 640.
48. Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 595. "A [patient's] peculiar or unfounded fear ...
might, if anything, require [the physician] to devote more time discussing its probability
with [the patient] .... " Id.
49. Appendix to Appellant K.A.C.'s Brief at A-40.
50. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 1995). From 1980 until June
1991, the Palen Clinic employed Dr. Philip Benson as a family practitioner. Id.
51. Id.
52. Respondent's Brief at 2. The type of bodily fluid exuding from Dr. Benson's
sores has been shown to be capable of carrying the HIV virus. See Richard N. Danila
et al., A Look-Back Investigation of Patients of an HIV-Infected Physician, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1406, 1407 (1991).
53. K.AC. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1209, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 WL 515825,
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993).
1996]
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other patients that he was HIV seropositive and advised them to have
an HIV test performed.54 None of the former patients, including
T.M.W., tested positive for the HIV antibody.55
Over fifty former patients of Dr. Benson, including TM.W., sued for
negligent nondisclosure.5 6 The district court, in its first order, stated
that "[p]laintiffs clearly had a right to know that Dr. Benson was
afflicted with the AIDS virus and that this posed a risk, however
minimal, to them."57  It also concluded that whether damages
resulted from Dr. Benson's nondisclosure was a jury question.5" In its
second order, however, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs must
allege actual exposure to, or direct contact with, Dr. Benson's bodily
fluids.59 Concluding that the patients had not made the required
showing, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 60
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that
the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing to withstand summary
judgment.61  It noted that "the standard of care in the medical
community requires physicians performing invasive procedures to
inform their patients of their HIV-infected status."62 The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial
54. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557. The letter read:
I am sending you this letter because there is a very minimal
possibility that you were exposed to the AIDS virus through body fluids
from this rash during certain medical procedures.... I did not realize
that there may have been any risk to you because I was wearing gloves
... even with gloves, an extremely minimal risk still existed. . . . the
likelihood that you have been infected with the AIDS virus from this type
of exposure is extremely low.
Id.
55. Id. Blood tests for the detection for HIV are extremely accurate. When used
in conjunction, the ELISA (Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay) and Western Blot
tests are more than 99.9 % accurate. Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327, 333 n.4 (Md.
1993). Ninety-five percent of H1V-infected individuals test positive within 6 months of
the date of viral transmission. Id. at 332.
56. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555. T.M.W. also alleged negligent infliction of
emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, and violation of
the Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 556. All patients except T.M.W. settled with Dr.
Benson and the Palen Clinic. Id. at 555-56.
57. Appendix to Respondent's Brief at A-96.
58. Id. at A-244.
59. Dist. Ct. Order & Mem. (Second Order) at 18 (March 15, 1993).
60. Id.
61. KA.C., 1993 WL 515825, at *1. The court of appeals relied on two cases
decided after the trial court's second order, Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993)
and Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), vacated, 868 P.2d 906
(Cal.), rev'd on reh'g, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
62. K.A.C., 1993 WL 515825, at *7.
[Vol. 22
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B. The Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that T.M.W.'s claim of negligent
nondisclosure must fail because "the undisclosed, minuscule 'risk' of
HIV exposure did not materialize in harm."6' After outlining the
disclosure requirements in Minnesota, the court expressly declined to
determine whether physicians have a duty to disclose their HIV status
to patients.65 Because T.M.W. tested negative for HIV, the court
concluded that no compensable injury had resulted and dismissed the
negligent nondisclosure claim.66
In his dissent, Justice Page suggested that the majority misapplied
the law.67 He argued that three jury questions remained: (1)"whether
[Dr.] Benson should have known T.M.W. attached particular signifi-
cance to the risk of disease transmission from his open and weeping
wounds.... (2) whether a reasonable person, in her position, would
have shared her fear" and (3) "whether the undisclosed risk of
transmission materialized in harm.
"68
Addressing the first issue, Justice Page, stated that a jury could find
that a reasonable person would refuse treatment if the risk was
disclosed. 69  With regard to the second, he argued that emotional
distress caused by a physician's failure to disclose a risk is a compensa-
ble injury.7"
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE K.A.C. DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to apply the doctrine of
informed consent in holding that the undisclosed risk of HIV exposure
must result in transmission of the HIV virus before a patient's claim
will survive summary judgment.71 It avoided determining whether the
informed consent doctrine requires disclosure of provider-associated
63. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 553.
64. Id. at 561-62.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 562-64 (Page, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 563-64.
69. Id. at 564.
70. Id. at 564. Justice Page noted:
The harm avoided by such disclosure is emotional distress on the part of
the patient-either because the physician explains away the cause of
worry, or because the patient does not consent to the treatment. Here,
emotional distress is precisely the harm T.M.W. claims she suffered
because of Benson's nondisclosure.
Id.
71. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 561-62.
1996]
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risks or whether the doctrine is limited only to those risks related to
proposed treatment.72  The court dodged its opportunity to clarify
this unsettled area of law. Arguably, Minnesota's informed consent law
is broad enough to encompass provider-associated risks, including a
physician's HIV-positive status.7"
In Minnesota, a physician's duty of disclosure is not limited to those
risks that the medical profession deems significant. Rather, physicians
must supply any information that reasonable, prudent patients would
regard as material to the health-care decision facing them.74 It is for
the patient to assess the benefits of a proposed medical procedure and
to determine for herself whether to undergo it.75 The decision is the
patient's, however unwise the physician believes that decision to be.76
"Although the probability of an adverse result may seem slight to the
physician . .. he cannot withhold information if it is relevant to [a]
patient's ability to make an informed consent." 77 Patients have a
right to determine what is done to their bodies, particularly when the
unavoidable consequence of HIV transmission is death.78
Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose
all information material79 to a patient's decision concerning a
particular medical treatment.80 It also requires disclosure of informa-
tion unrelated to the proposed treatment but which could impact the
72. Id.
73. This Case Note does not analyze whether T.M.W. was "actually exposed" to the
AIDS virus or whether actual exposure is required before a compensable injury results.
74. E.g., Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Minn. 1981); Conrfeldt v.
Tongen, 295 N.W.2d at 638, 640 (Minn. 1980). A duty to disclose may be established
by a showing that a "reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have
known to be the patient's position would likely attach significance to that risk or
alternative" in deciding whether to consent to treatment. Id.
75. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Majorie
Macguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J 219, 220 (1985). "[T]he more intense and personal the consequences of a choice
and the less direct or significant the impact of that choice upon others, the more
compelling the claim to autonomy in the making of a given decision." Id.
76. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676,687-88 (R.I. 1972) (emphasizing that patient's
right to make decision in light of own value judgment is very essence of freedom of
choice).
77. Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978).
78. See Gostin, supra note 20, at 37. "if the adverse consequences would be
intolerable for the reasonable, prudent patient, that patient's entitled to make the
decision . . . ." Id.
79. E.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) "Material information
is that which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by
a reasonable person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject the
recommended medical procedure." Id.
80. E.g., Nan Perley, supra note 28, at 338; Schultz, supra note 75, at 221-23.
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patient's decision.8 A physician's HIV status is highly material to a
patient's decision to be treated by that physician and thus should be
disclosed. 2 The law recognizes that it is up to the individual, rather
than the physician, to weigh all the risks and make an informed
decision.8
3
Dr. Benson's HIV seropositive status constituted a material risk to his
patients. Although the probability of transmitting the HIV virus from
health-care provider to patient is usually extremely low, 4 under these
particular circumstances it was likely greater.8 5 The gravity of the
harm, inevitably death, coupled with the ability to completely eliminate
the risk makes this risk material.88
81. E.g., Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1281 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991). In Behringer the plaintiffs argued that the informed consent doctrine
did not require a surgeon's physical condition to be disclosed as a risk of the surgery.
The court stated that "[t ] he informed consent cases are not so narrow as to support that
argument." Id.
82. See Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1499, 1500 (1991) (favoring disclosure).
83. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 ((D.C. Cir. 1972). "True consent
to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant
upon each." Id. "Few if any choices are more private and intimate than those that
concern the use made of one's body, and thus society should not permit one's bodily
integrity to be threatened by another unless one has knowingly and voluntarily
consented to (i.e., willed) the intrusion." Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent,
103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994).
84. The Center for Disease Control estimates the probability of HIV transmission
from an infected surgeon to a patient to be between one in 40,000 and one in 400,000.
Norman Daniels, HIV-Infected Professionals, Patient Rights and the 'Switching Dilemma, 267
JAMA 1368, 1369 (1992).
85. The New England Journal of Medicine published a case study, documenting
the incidents giving rise to the K.A.C. litigation. The authors stated:
According to standard infection-control policies, the physician we have
described should not have had direct contact with patients during the
time of his severe hand dermatitis. This incident underscores the need
to reinforce standard infection-control policies in clinical settings.
The lack of HIV transmission in the patients we studied is encourag-
ing, given the severity of the physician's dermatitis and the presence of
serous fluids potentially containing HIV.
Danila et al., supra note 52, at 1409.
86. In Canterbury, a one percent risk of paralysis from a laminectomy was
considered material. 464 F.2d at 794. In Hidding v. Williams, which also involved a
laminectomy, a one in 200,000 risk of loss of bowel and bladder control was found to
be material. 578 So.2d 1192, 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1991). In Doe v. Johnston, 476
N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991), which involved a provider's failure to inform a patient of
the risk of contracting AIDS from a blood transfusion, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that the issue of materiality of a risk was ajury question.
The Supreme Court of Texas defined "materiality" to include "how the condition
manifests itself; the perman[e]ncy of the condition caused by the risk; the known cures
for the condition; the seriousness of the condition; and the overall effect of the
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The risk of HIV transmission is unique compared to other general
risks of a medical procedure because the patient can readily avoid the
risk by seeking treatment elsewhere, from an uninfected physician. 7
If a patient can receive virtually the same services from another equally
qualified physician without any risk of acquiring the lethal virus, the
patient who chooses the non-infected physician is acting reasonably.8
While no patients are guaranteed a risk-free, health-care environment,
surely they are entitled to the elimination of any and all risks within
their physician's control. These risks are to be distinguished from risks
inherent to a particular procedure, which patients cannot eliminate
regardless of where they go for treatment or who performs the
procedure. Physicians should not deprive patients of their right to
make an informed decision.
Given the deadly nature of AIDS, physicians are not only ethically
obligated as professionals, but also legally obligated under the doctrine
of informed consent, to disclose their HIV-positive status."9 Insisting
that patients only consider the underlying probabilities of death when
they assess risks is strongly paternalistic."0 Even though the risk is
slight, transmission is fatal. 9 Above all, patients can avoid the risk
entirely by choosing another physician.
To prevail on a claim of negligent nondisclosure, a patient must also
prove proximate cause. 2  In Minnesota, causation is based on an
condition on the body." Barclay v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. 1986). With
respect to HIV, the condition manifests itself by infection, the infection is permanent,
no cures exist, and the effect is fatal.
87. See A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The Unreasonably Dangerous Patient,
46 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1430 (1993).
88. Id.
89. E.g., Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). The court stated, "a physician
who knows that he or she has an infectious disease, which if contracted by the patient
would pose a significant risk to that patient, should not engage in any activity that
creates a risk of transmission of that disease to the patient." Id. at 334 (quoting Current
Opinions, Code of Medical Ethics, AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
(1992)).
90. Daniels, supra note 85, at 1370.
91. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972). "A very small
chance of death or serious disablement may well be significant; a potential disability
which dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the detriments of
the existing malady may summons discussion with the patient." Id.
92. To establish proximate cause, the plaintiffs must show that had the risk been
disclosed, they would not have consented to the proposed treatment. The Minnesota
civil jury instruction regarding informed consent states:
1. The physician knew or should have known of the risk involved in
surgery or other treatment, or alternatives to such surgery or treatment;
2. The risk or alternative treatment was significant enough that the
physician should have told his or her patient of it. A risk or alternative
treatment is significant if the physician knew or should have known that
it would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the
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objective standard: that of a reasonable person. 9 Some physicians
and health-care professionals may argue that a "reasonable" person
would not refuse treatment if informed of the risk because of the low
probability of transmission. However, more than eighty percent of
patients want to know the HIV status of their physicians.94 Further,
if informed that their physician was HIV-positive, most people would
choose another provider.9 Arguably, these particular preferences of
a majority of Americans are not unreasonable.
Some commentators argue that physician-associated risks lie outside
the doctrine of informed consent or that the risks are too small to be
material. 6 They contend that given the low risk of transmission, the
physician's right of privacy, and the possible adverse effect on the
health-care system, physicians should not be required to inform their
patients as long as proper precautions are taken to prevent transmis-
sion.97 While disclosure would have an obvious adverse impact on the
physician, concern for the provider's rights must not overshadow the
rights of "the most critical participant-the patient."" Difficulties
created by public reaction to AIDS cannot deprive the patient of
making the ultimate decision where the risk is so significant.99
patient's position when deciding to accept or reject surgery or other
treatment;
3. The physician failed to disclose the risk or alternative treatment
to the patient;
4. A reasonable patient in the patient's position would not have
consented to the treatment or operation if the risk or an alternative
treatment had been known; and
5. [That] the undisclosed risk resulted in harm from the treatment
or operation which was performed (the injury sustained by the plaintiff
would have been avoided by the undisclosed alternative treatment).
MINN. Civ. JIG 427.1 (1992). See also Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Minn.
1980); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d at 684, 689 (Minn. 1977).
93. E.g., Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 701.
94. A 1991 Newsweek poll found that 90% of Americans wanted to know their
physician's HIV status. Jane Gross, Many Doctors Infected with AIDS Don't Follow New U.S.
Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, August 18, 1991, at A20.
95. Sandra L. Mitchell, Employment Issues Facing HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 3
J. PHARMACY & L. 5, 27 n.41 (1994) (stating that more than 50% of those surveyed
would change doctors upon learning of their doctor's HIV-positive status).
96. E.g., Daniels, supra note 84, at 1369; Darrell Fun, HIV-Infected Healers: Do Patients
Have a Right to Know? 21 BRIEF 6 (Summer 1992).
97. See Daniels, supra note 84, at 1371 (concluding that there should be no duty
to disclose). See also Bobinski, supra note 37, at 304-06 (arguing that broad disclosure
requirements are not supportable); Chai R. Feldblum, A Response to Gostin "The HIV-In-
fected Health Care Professional: Public Policy, Discrimination, and Patient Safety", 19 LAw MED.
& HEALTH CARE 134 (1991) (stating that the risk is not material, and further, that
provider-associated risks lie outside the informed consent doctrine).
98. Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
99. Id. at 1280.
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Courts require physicians to disclose all information that a reason-
able patient would find relevant to make an informed decision on
whether to undergo a medical procedure.00 "As the severity of
potential harm becomes greater the need to disclose improbable risks
grows."' O' While the risk may be low, it does exist.10 2 More impor-
tantly, the risk can be eliminated completely by choosing another
physician who is not infected with HIV. "Where the ultimate harm is
death, even the presence of a low risk of transmission justifies the
adoption of a policy which precludes invasive procedures when there
is 'any' risk of transmission."1"3
V. CONCLUSION
Risks relevant to a patient's decision to undergo a medical proce-
dure usually have been confined to risks related to the proposed
treatment rather than to those associated with the treating physi-
cian.1°4 However, because the purpose of the doctrine of informed
consent is to place the health-care decision with the patient, 5
physician-associated risks are just as relevant, if not more so, as those
related to the treatment itself. The risk of HIV exposure can be
completely avoided by choosing an uninfected physician. A physician's
HIV status constitutes a material risk to the patient and thus should be
included with the informed consent doctrine.
This Case Note does not call for an industry-wide standard requiring
disclosure of all HIV-infected health care providers under all circum-
stances. Instead, it argues for disclosure when a physician proposes an
invasive procedure and a risk of transmission exists. Patients have the
right to be informed of the risk and to decide whether they are willing
to accept it.
Ranelle A. Leier




104. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 37, at 343-45.
105. Gostin, supra note 20, at 33-34.
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